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Increasing National Saving:
Are IRAs the Answer?
by David Altig and Katherine A. Samolyk
k3aving, so advised the proverbial ant
to the spendthrift grasshopper, allows an
individual to "prepare today for the wants
of tomorrow." Likewise for an econ-
omy, national saving provides resources
for capital accumulation, expanding the
economy's future productive capacity
and hence its future potential output. The
precipitous decline in average saving
rates during the 1980s, as measured by
the National Income and Product Ac-
counts (NIPA), has convinced many that
we have become a nation of grasshop-
pers in need of policies that will turn us
back into a nation of ants.
Among the currently popular policy
options aimed at increasing national
saving are proposals that would estab-
lish personal saving incentives by ex-
panding federal tax deductions for con-
tributions to individual retirement
accounts (IRAs). One version of this
type of policy was recently introduced
by Senators Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas)
and William Roth (R-Delaware).
At least some of the support for IRA
tax subsidies is a result of recent U.S.
experience. Preferential tax treatment
of IRAs, which had been available to a
limited number of people since the mid-
1970s, was made available to all wage
earners by the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 (ERTA). These deductions
were substantially curtailed by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86).
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Contributions to IRAs grew dramatically
in the period between ERTA and TRA86,
accounting for nearly 25 percent of
personal saving by 1986. Although their
claims are controversial, several formal
studies suggest that a considerable frac-
tion of this growth represented net addi-
tions to personal saving.
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Even if this is true, evidence that IRA
subsidies are effective in increasing per-
sonal saving does not necessarily sup-
port reinstatement of the subsidy provi-
sions in place prior to TRA86. One
well-known problem that policymakers
must consider involves the contribution
of IRA tax breaks, which reduce federal
revenues, to growth of the federal defi-
cit. Even if IRA subsidies do increase
personal saving, it is far from clear that
they have a positive effect on national
saving. In the current debate, this ten-
sion between IRA policy and deficit
reduction efforts is manifested in
budget rules requiring that all lost
revenues be replaced through expendi-
ture reductions or alternative taxes.
A further, and less discussed, problem is
the potential link between proposed IRA
subsidies and household debt. Allowing
tax deductions for IRA contributions
can — and will, we argue — create in-
centives for increased household bor-
rowing. At a time of growing concern
about the level of private-sector debt, it
would indeed be ironic if policymakers
adopted a tax policy that had the conse-
quence, unintended as it might be, of
increasing household leverage.
In contrast to policies that subsidize
particular forms of personal saving are
In response to falling U.S. saving rates,
Congress is considering legislation that
would once again expand federal tax
deductions for IRA contributions. But
evidence shows that attempting to
stimulate national saving by subsidiz-
ing personal saving has serious draw-
backs, such as incompatibility with
recent budget reforms and increased
incentives for household borrowing.
The authors argue that curtailing
deductions for personal interest ex-
pense would be a more effective strat-
egy for increasing national saving.
those that would eliminate subsidies to
particular types of personal borrowing.
An example of the latter is legislation
introduced by Congressman Frank
Guarini (D-New Jersey) that would re-
strict interest deductions on certain pur-
chases made from home-equity loans.
The problems that mitigate the useful-
ness of IRA subsidy plans as policy
tools for increasing U.S. saving rates do
not arise under the type of policy con-
templated in the Guarini proposal. Our
principal message in this Economic
Commentary is that, given the goal of
increasing national saving by inducing
greater personal saving, IRA subsidy
schemes are inferior to policies that
would eliminate incentives for house-
hold debt accumulation.
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and the Federal Deficit
A subsidy is essentially a gift—a gift
with strings attached, perhaps, but a
gift nonetheless. And so it is when the
government grants tax deductibility for
IRA contributions: If you agree to the
rules governing these contributions,
you get the gift.
Suppose, then, that your IRA contribu-
tion yields a gift of $ 1,000. Would your
saving increase? Quite likely it would.
Under what most economists consider
normal circumstances, some of the
subsidy-provided windfall would be
put away "for the wants of tomorrow."
But — and here's the essence of the
problem — some of the subsidy would
immediately contribute to increased
consumption.
If the hypothesized IRA subsidy is not
matched by a decrease in government
consumption (or an increase in other
taxes), every dollar of subsidy becomes
a dollar of public-sector dissaving, or a
dollar increase in the government
sector's deficit. Thus, even if private
saving expands by some fraction of the
subsidy/gift, national saving (the sum
of private and public saving) actually
falls and national consumption rises.
Where would the additional resources
needed to satisfy this increase in con-
sumption come from? They must arise
from one of two sources: domestic firms
or foreigners. If current consumption
comes at the expense of resources avail-
able to domestic firms, then investment
falls, and with it the capital stock avail-
able for future production. If current
consumption is provided by foreigners,
then they must be repaid from future
production. In either event, the increase
in current consumption will reduce the
amount of domestic consumption avail-
able in the future.
The implication of these observations
for interpreting data from the 1982—
1986 IRA experiment is obvious. It is
simply not sufficient to suggest that
preferential tax treatment of IRAs
caused personal saving to rise, as sev-
eral studies have implied. The relevant
issue, and the one captured in the con-
cept of national saving, concerns the
degree to which the policy encouraged
or discouraged aggregate consumption.
On this score, both casual observation
of the path of national saving and for-
mal econometric analysis suggest a
healthy skepticism about the proposi-
tion that IRA subsidies over this period
contributed in any substantial way to
expanding the U.S. capital stock.'
• IRA Subsidies in the
Brave New Budget World
The political environment into which
new tax breaks must now be born dif-
fers considerably from the one that saw
passage of ERTA. The "pay-as-you-go"
provisions of last year's federal budget
agreement preclude financing IRA tax
deductions by expanding the deficit.
Under the provisions of that agreement,
any projected revenue loss must be
counterbalanced by other taxes, reduc-
tions in federal expenditures, or both.
Although the pay-as-you-go restriction
is not necessarily an argument against
adoption of IRA subsidies, it does intro-
duce elements that increase the uncer-
tainty about such a policy's net effects.
If, for instance, projected losses from
IRA subsidies are compensated with al-
ternative taxes, then any saving disin-
centives associated with these new
taxes must be factored against the pre-
sumed benefits of the IRA policy.
Alternatively, if IRA subsidies are "paid
for" by government spending cuts, the
shift in resources from the government
to households could increase capital ac-
cumulation if, as we have argued is like-
ly, households respond by saving at
least a fraction of the IRA tax break.
But Congress could get a "dollar-for-
dollar" increase in public saving by
reducing federal expenditures directly.
In other words, the value of a reduction
in government expenditures is not logi-
cally related to IRA policy.
A broader point is that the new federal
budget rules inevitably require the pro-
posed IRA subsidies to be bundled with
other, unrelated fiscal policies. Conse-
quently, political obstacles and eco-
nomic uncertainties confronting the
proponents of new IRA policies are
magnified.
• IRAs and Household
Debt Accumulation
Concerns about the downward trend in
U.S. saving rates have been paralleled
by reservations about the recent in-
crease in personal debt accumulation
and by the perception that relatively
high personal debt levels make the U.S.
economy especially vulnerable to mac-
roeconomic shocks. Indeed, concerns
about low saving rates and high per-
sonal debt burdens are often raised by
the same voices that sing the praises of
tax-induced saving incentives.
Ironically, a policy designed to increase
the personal saving rate by reintroduc-
ing tax breaks for IRA contributions can
have the unintended side effect of
increasing household leverage. The
potential for IRA subsidies to induce
more borrowing is widely appreciated.
As noted by the Treasury Department's
Donald Lubick in testimony before the
House of Representatives' 1980 hear-
ings on saving incentives, taxpayers
"have the possibility of gaming the sys-
tem through borrowing and taking inter-
est deductions and putting the borrowed
money into the tax deferred account.,,6
The opportunity to engage in this type
of tax arbitrage introduces powerful in-
centives for debt accumulation, even in
cases where IRA subsidies do induce a
household to increase its net saving. In
fact, it appears that IRA subsidies simul-
taneously increase borrowing and net
personal saving: Taxpayers who pur-
chased IRAs between 1980 and 1984
tended to have higher growth in debt-
related interest deductions than did
otherwise similar taxpayers who did not
purchase IRAs.
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What is even more pertinent to the issue
of household financial fragility is that
this behavior was particularly pro-
nounced among taxpayers with lower
levels of taxable wealth. Although the
existence of tax loopholes makes the in-
terpretation of taxable wealth levels
tricky, low-wealth households are exact-
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most susceptible to payment problems
in the event of a sudden drop in income.
Of course, opportunities to leverage
IRA-type investments not only increase
household debt burdens, but also dimin-
ish the incentive to reduce consump-
tion. In the final analysis, all policies
designed to induce more saving must be
judged by the standard of their effects
on aggregate consumption.
• An Alternative
None of the problems discussed so far
— the possibility of larger federal defi-
cits, the problematic nature of avoiding
larger deficits with other fiscal policies,
and increased incentives for household
borrowing — imply in and of them-
selves that IRA subsidy plans should
be avoided. As with all policy options,
the relevant calculations require weigh-
ing the costs and benefits. If there were
a reasonable expectation that the net
effect of such subsidies would be an in-
crease in national saving, then the real
or potential costs might be well worth
bearing.
One should ask, however, whether other
policies could attain the objective with-
out encountering these complications.
We contend that there is a straightfor-
ward alternative: Make borrowing less
attractive by restricting the deductibility
of household interest expenses.
A policy that reduced household dissav-
ing would obviously serve the ultimate
end of increasing personal saving. More
to the point of our argument, such a
policy would not suffer the same defi-
ciencies as one that attempted to
increase personal saving via IRA subsi-
dies. Because eliminating or reducing
interest deductions would raise reve-
nues directly, the policy could be pur-
sued without expanding the federal defi-
cit or worrying about additional policies
to maintain budget balance at the mar-
gin. Furthermore, a policy that removed
the incentive to borrow would simul-
taneously discourage debt accumulation
and encourage saving rather than con-
sumption. Thus, the household leverage
issues that appear in the IRA subsidy
case simply would not arise under an ap-
proach that limits interest deductions.
But would such deductions truly have
the desired effect of reducing house-
hold borrowing and increasing personal
saving? We claim that evidence from the
1980s, while ambiguous with respect to
the effectiveness of IRA policies, strong-
ly supports the proposition that tax in-
centives have a profound effect on
household borrowing behavior.
• Personal Interest Deductions
and Saving: Some Evidence
Evidence that personal interest deduc-
tions can exert a powerful influence on
household borrowing can be found in
the pattern of household debt accumula-
tion subsequent to TRA86. The key ele-
ment of TRA86 in this regard was the
elimination of deductibility provisions
for interest payments on debt not
secured by real estate. Thus, while mort-
gage interest retained its status as a de-
ductible expense, interest on debt
explicitly associated with consumption
expenditures — primarily consumer
installment credit — lost its preferen-
tial tax treatment.
Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of dif-
ferent categories of household debt
from 1970 to 1989. It is apparent that
the growth in installment credit (as a
percentage of GNP) characterizing the
period from 1983 to 1986 came to a
halt after 1986. The "other consumer
credit" category, which reflects non-
mortgage-related, nonrevolving debt
(and so includes obligations that are
less likely to be interest sensitive), was
relatively unaffected by TRA86, con-
tinuing the slight downward drift rela-
tive to GNP that has characterized this
series since 1970.
Home mortgage debt, on the other hand,
exploded after 1986, rising 26 percent
relative to GNP between 1986 and 1989.
This surge in mortgage-related debt can-
not be accounted for by rapid growth in
residential real estate acquisition. The
ratio of the value of residential structures
to GNP has been fairly stable since the
end of the 1981-1982 recession.
It is more likely that most of the growth
in mortgage-related debt since 1986 re-
flects a shift in borrowing behavior from
installment and other nonmortgage debt,
for which interest payments are no long-
er tax deductible, to debt that is secured
by residential real estate, which is still
tax preferred. Indeed, the Federal Re-
serve's 1988 Survey of Consumer Atti-
tudes indicates that 64 percent of exist-
ing home-equity lines of credit (and
about 20 percent of traditional home-
equity loans) had been originated since
1986. Furthermore, 35 to 40 percent of
these loans had been specifically used
in repayment of other debt.
Additional evidence on the relative
effectiveness of IRA subsidies com-
pared with limitations on personal
borrowing deductions can be found by
examining cross-country saving behav-
ior. For instance, a significant part of
the difference in U.S. and Canadian
saving rates between 1961 and 1985
can be explained by the fact that inter-
est payments on consumer debt were
fully deductible here, but not in Can-
ada. In fact, evidence indicates that
the tax treatment of interest expense
may be a more important determinant
of saving behavior than the tax treat-
ment of long-term saving instruments
like IRAs.
• Conclusion
Many well-informed and thoughtful
people believe that policies designed toincrease national saving rates are im-
perative for the long-term health of the
U.S. economy. In light of this, it is easy
to understand the appeal of tax policies
that would provide incentives for higher
levels of long-term saving.
Unfortunately, proposals to subsidize
IRAs suffer from complications ranging
from ultimate ineffectiveness to political
infeasibility to undesirable side effects.
Past experience shows that an alterna-
tive tax policy that makes borrowing
less attractive would be effective and
would avoid many of the complications
associated with IRA subsidies. If we are
to look toward incentives in the personal
tax code to stimulate capital accumula-
tion, our efforts should focus on policies
that discourage dissaving rather than on
those that resurrect saving incentives
with ambiguous track records.
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